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LETTER TO THE E D I T O R  
On Definitions 
Dear Sirs: 
In this Journal, Vol. XXIV (1-2), pages 14-21, 1975, M. Jeuken writes on 'the 
biological and philosophical definitions of  life'. As I found many remarks in 
this article rather confusing, I hope you will allow me the following remarks 
in order to point out my problems. 
I. There is, it seems to me, some confusion as to the definition of 'definit ion' .  
In my experience it is useful, and even necessary, before starting a discussion 
or a treatise to start out defining the terms that will be used. This really 
means making an appointment concerning what we will be talking about. So 
if we must tell a group of  students what biology is all about, we must try to 
tell which phenomena are, and which are not, studied by biology. Whether 
or not viruses will be taken to belong to the class of  living entities is just a 
matter  of  definition in this sense. 
Jeuken proposes a biological definition of life which, according to him, 
must be clearly distinguished from a philosophical definition and he pro- 
poses a biological definition. But then he states (p. 15): 'This definition is 
confirmed by experiments, especially of modern research'. I don' t  see 
how a definition in the above sense (which is only about the way in which 
we are going to use the terms in our language) can ever be confirmed, 
denied, falsified or verified by experiments. The only interpretation which 
might make sense is, that experiments have shown that the set of  pheno- 
mena designated as 'life' by definition A (say Jeuken's) is equivalent to 
the set of  phenomena designated as 'life' by some other definition B. For 
example, suppose that one definition calls an object alive if it contains DNA, 
and another calls an object alive if it entertains a specified process called 
'metabolism'.  Experiments might show that any object containing DNA 
has metabolism and vice versa, and then one might say that experiments 
have shown the two definitions to be equivalent in the sense that they refer 
to the same phenomena.  But Jeuken does not quote the other  definition of  
'life' to which his definition should be equivalent; nor does he argue why 
we need his definition in addition to an other one. 
I suspect that 'definition' may have a somewhat different meaning in 
certain contexts. This meaning might be something like this: there is a set 
of objects, or phenomena,  and we all know them and give them a name. For 
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example, we need the poor  viruses to show that it is not always obvious 
what we mean by 'a living being'. Now we wish to find alist of all properties 
of  the objects and phenomena so designated, and which are not shared by 
objects or phenomena not so designated. 
If we wish to define, e.g., 'living organism' in the first sense, we wish just 
a brief characterization which is necessary and sufficient to define how the 
term 'living organism' will be used, and what kind of things are being studied 
by biologists. 
If we wish to define 'living organism' in the second sense, we strive at a 
complete characterization of living organisms. The first definition would 
define terminology; the second is only provisory, because it will never be 
completed. Its formulation might be called an aim of research. But in my 
opinion, in order to attain a 'definition' of the second kind, we need a 
definition of the first kind to start with. It makes no sense to ask for all 
properties of living organisms if we have not stated just what we mean by 
'organisms'. I therefore propose to refrain from using the word 'definition' 
to designate the second type definition, but to use other words such as 
'characterization'  or 'description'. 
2. The definition proposed by Jeuken is as follows: 
'life is a definite dynamic structure of atoms and molecules, exhibiting self- 
regulation'. 
I have grave objections against this definition, as it is not compatible with 
the sense in which 'life' is usually taken by biologists. 'Thel ife  of the Robin'  
is not a definite dynamic structure. The Robin itself might be called a de- 
finite dynamic structure, but its life is a sequence of more or less random 
phenomena.  'Life'  as the object of  study of biology is not a definite dynamic 
structure either, but a very varied set of phenomena.  Furthermore,  any 
computer  designer will be able to build a contraption consisting of atoms 
and molecules which would exhibit self-regulation in any operational sense 
of the word and which might be said to be a definite dynamic structure in 
any operational sense of those words. 
But Jeuken specifies: 'The term "definite" indicates the structure as it is 
found in the cell. In the term "self-regulation" all the functions are 
included'. 
This specification does not help me, however, as the first part  of it begs the 
question (what on earth is 'a cell'?) and the second leaves me in doubt 
whether we are supposed to possess a complete list of well-defined 'func- 
tions' which are not found with computers and such, or whether we have an 
example of the second kind of 'definition' alluded to above. 
3. It may occur to you that my remarks miss the main point Jeuken wishes to 
make in his article. This may be so. I gather that this must have something 
to do with his opinion that 'Science can and must give inspiration to philo- 
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sophy, but no arguments, and the same holds suo modo for philosophy as 
regards its inspiration to science'. I am certainly not well enough acquainted 
with philosophy to be permitted a different opinion. But I think I may 
point out what it leads to. The fun of science lies exactly in the arguments. 
For a simple minded biologist it is not clear how a philosopher may be 
inspired by biology without taking the arguments seriously. He will be 
afraid that what the philosopher will borrow from biology is mainly specula- 
tive nonsense, and he will not be inclined to have anything to do with 




State University at Groningen, 
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Reply to Reddingius's letter 
Reddingius' objections give me the opportunity to clarify some points and for 
this I wish to express my thanks to him. 
a. There are various kinds of definitions. As an example of a system of defini- 
tions I refer to Arthur Pap's paper 'Theory of definition' (Phil. of Sc., 31, 1964, 
p. 49-54). One type of definition Pap distinguishes is the 'propositional 
definition', which can be built up either by empirical or by analytical proposi- 
tions. A definition which is an empirical proposition can be theoretical, i.e. an 
empirical proposition about scientific objects. He gives the example 'water is a 
substance composed of molecules consisting of two hydrogen atoms and one 
oxygen atom (H20)'. Then he says that this statement 'must be justified by 
reference to experimental results interpreted by a scientific theory (atomic 
theory of matter)'. And a little further on, he says that the cited definition of 
water 'expresses the empirical generalization that anything which has the 
qualitative properties connoted by 'water' as the term is used in daily life also 
has that chemical structure, and conversely' (p. 50). 
It is in this sense of a propositional definition with an empirical and theoret- 
ical definiens as indicated by Pap, that I have given my biological definition of 
life. And when I wrote that my definition 'is confirmed by experiments' it is the 
same as when Pap writes that such a definition 'must be justified by reference to 
experimental results'. Reddingius seems to think that definitions can be only 
